by Edward Kazarian and Leigh M. Johnson
A little over two
years ago, more than 600 philosophers petitioned the American Philosophical Association to
“produce a code of conduct and a statement of professional ethics for the
academic discipline of Philosophy.” The immediate motivation for the petition
was several high-profile cases of sexual misconduct by philosophers, which together
amplified what many viewed—rightly, in our estimation—as a widespread and
endemic culture of hostility, predation, exploitation, and intimidation within
the profession. Shortly thereafter, in
March 2014, we co-authored a piece entitled “Please Do NOT Revise Your Tone,” articulating our concerns about the problematic
effects of tone-policing, generally, and about the drafting and institution of
a “Code of Conduct” by the APA, specifically.
In that piece, we argued that there was good reason to worry that such a
Code would:
years ago, more than 600 philosophers petitioned the American Philosophical Association to
“produce a code of conduct and a statement of professional ethics for the
academic discipline of Philosophy.” The immediate motivation for the petition
was several high-profile cases of sexual misconduct by philosophers, which together
amplified what many viewed—rightly, in our estimation—as a widespread and
endemic culture of hostility, predation, exploitation, and intimidation within
the profession. Shortly thereafter, in
March 2014, we co-authored a piece entitled “Please Do NOT Revise Your Tone,” articulating our concerns about the problematic
effects of tone-policing, generally, and about the drafting and institution of
a “Code of Conduct” by the APA, specifically.
In that piece, we argued that there was good reason to worry that such a
Code would:
1) impose a disproportionate
burden of changing their behavior to “fit in” on those who are
members of out- (that is, underrepresented or minority) groups within the
profession; 2) likely be applied disproportionately against those expressing
dissenting views or criticizing colleagues for lapses in judgment or
perception; and 3) tend to reinforce or provide opportunities to reiterate the
structures of privilege and exclusion already operating within the
profession.
burden of changing their behavior to “fit in” on those who are
members of out- (that is, underrepresented or minority) groups within the
profession; 2) likely be applied disproportionately against those expressing
dissenting views or criticizing colleagues for lapses in judgment or
perception; and 3) tend to reinforce or provide opportunities to reiterate the
structures of privilege and exclusion already operating within the
profession.
The
Executive Board of the APA subsequently decided in favor of producing the
document and, earlier this week, published the final version of the
discipline’s official “Code of Conduct” here.
Executive Board of the APA subsequently decided in favor of producing the
document and, earlier this week, published the final version of the
discipline’s official “Code of Conduct” here.
Reading
that document over, our original worries remain unassuaged and unabated. We are especially concerned now that this quasi-official
document—which elaborates a set of norms, but does not include any mechanisms
for enforcement, adjudication, or sanction—will inevitably be used at the local
(department-, college-, or university) level in unofficial, ad-hoc ways to
undermine or sabotage already vulnerable members of the profession. Worse, we
worry that this document will provide pretext for attempts to pressure APA
members by complaining to their employers that they have in some instance or
another behaved ‘unprofessionally.’ We recognize that any law or regulative
code as such allows for the
possibility of perverse application, but we maintain that the current iteration
of this Code of Conduct is particularly susceptible to manipulation for a
number of reasons.
that document over, our original worries remain unassuaged and unabated. We are especially concerned now that this quasi-official
document—which elaborates a set of norms, but does not include any mechanisms
for enforcement, adjudication, or sanction—will inevitably be used at the local
(department-, college-, or university) level in unofficial, ad-hoc ways to
undermine or sabotage already vulnerable members of the profession. Worse, we
worry that this document will provide pretext for attempts to pressure APA
members by complaining to their employers that they have in some instance or
another behaved ‘unprofessionally.’ We recognize that any law or regulative
code as such allows for the
possibility of perverse application, but we maintain that the current iteration
of this Code of Conduct is particularly susceptible to manipulation for a
number of reasons.
First, the APA Code of Conduct is entirely silent on matters of adjudication
and enforcement. Absent any “teeth,” in our view, the current Code of
Conduct really isn’t worth the Internet it’s written on. We fail to see why
some mechanism for censuring or sanctioning violators of the norms outlined in
the Code of Conduct as the APA interprets
those norms was not included in the document. As it now stands, the Code of
Conduct leaves itself open to—and, we worry, invites—idiosyncratic interpretations of its prescriptions and
proscriptions, thus making it far more likely that it will be used as a sort of
back-door weapon to tarnish the reputation and professional standing of APA
members generally and especially of precarious faculty, who will inevitably
suffer the worst consequences from such efforts. The fact that two tenured full
professors and APA members, Jason Stanley (Yale) and Rebecca Kukla (Georgetown)
were recently subject to coordinated waves of complaints to their employers, based
largely on the alleged incivility and unprofessionalism of things they said on
Facebook, should bring home just how potentially
damaging such tactics are. And it should be easy to see how similar attacks are
likely to be more damaging to those who are, unlike Stanley and Kukla, precariously
employed. Inasmuch the current Code of
Conduct can—and indeed almost surely will—be
used as a pretext to go after APA members for perceived ‘violations’ by any
number of parties, we worry that it is worse
than “merely unenforceable.” In fact, we cannot say with any certainty who
might make use of this Code as justification, or for what purpose, and neither can
the APA, which is a devastating flaw in its current construction.
and enforcement. Absent any “teeth,” in our view, the current Code of
Conduct really isn’t worth the Internet it’s written on. We fail to see why
some mechanism for censuring or sanctioning violators of the norms outlined in
the Code of Conduct as the APA interprets
those norms was not included in the document. As it now stands, the Code of
Conduct leaves itself open to—and, we worry, invites—idiosyncratic interpretations of its prescriptions and
proscriptions, thus making it far more likely that it will be used as a sort of
back-door weapon to tarnish the reputation and professional standing of APA
members generally and especially of precarious faculty, who will inevitably
suffer the worst consequences from such efforts. The fact that two tenured full
professors and APA members, Jason Stanley (Yale) and Rebecca Kukla (Georgetown)
were recently subject to coordinated waves of complaints to their employers, based
largely on the alleged incivility and unprofessionalism of things they said on
Facebook, should bring home just how potentially
damaging such tactics are. And it should be easy to see how similar attacks are
likely to be more damaging to those who are, unlike Stanley and Kukla, precariously
employed. Inasmuch the current Code of
Conduct can—and indeed almost surely will—be
used as a pretext to go after APA members for perceived ‘violations’ by any
number of parties, we worry that it is worse
than “merely unenforceable.” In fact, we cannot say with any certainty who
might make use of this Code as justification, or for what purpose, and neither can
the APA, which is a devastating flaw in its current construction.
Second, some of the
discursive, pedagogical, and ideological norms outlined in the APA Code of
Conduct are over-corrective. We applaud the efforts of the drafting committee to
address the widespread practice of online and IRL “bullying and harassment” in
our profession, and we support without reservation the call to “treat others
fairly, equitably, and with dignity,” to “maintain integrity and trust in all
professional commitments and interactions,” and to recognize that “power and
seniority” do not exempt anyone from expectations of minimally decent
behavior. However, the Code of Conduct’s
requirement that professional philosophers “respect the philosophical opinions
and traditions of others, without disparaging those who hold positions at odds
with one’s own” constitutes, in our view, a prescriptive overreach. On our reading, such a requirement is
entirely inconsistent with the basic tenets of intellectual integrity. One can,
after all, treat others fairly, equitably and with dignity, as well as
“maintain integrity and trust” in one’s commitments and interactions without obviating the possibility that
one might also regard or represent the positions of one’s interlocutors as
being of little worth—or even as morally outrageous. Indeed, we
think it is crucial to recognize that “disparaging” others’ positions may well
be part and parcel of the very needful process of critically examining both the
history of philosophy and its contemporary practice with regard to racism,
eurocentrism, sexism, heterosexism, ableism, and other morally objectionable
ideologies. We stipulate that (what we suspect were) the intentions of the
drafting committee in proscribing “disparaging those who hold positions at odds
with one’s own” are well-meaning, but the inclusion of this proscription in a
professional Code of Conduct is both dangerous and frightening. Especially when
coupled with our third concern (detailed below), we maintain that such a
proscription will effectively work as a gag-order against those who might
challenge, dispute, or oppose dominant professional discourses and norms.
discursive, pedagogical, and ideological norms outlined in the APA Code of
Conduct are over-corrective. We applaud the efforts of the drafting committee to
address the widespread practice of online and IRL “bullying and harassment” in
our profession, and we support without reservation the call to “treat others
fairly, equitably, and with dignity,” to “maintain integrity and trust in all
professional commitments and interactions,” and to recognize that “power and
seniority” do not exempt anyone from expectations of minimally decent
behavior. However, the Code of Conduct’s
requirement that professional philosophers “respect the philosophical opinions
and traditions of others, without disparaging those who hold positions at odds
with one’s own” constitutes, in our view, a prescriptive overreach. On our reading, such a requirement is
entirely inconsistent with the basic tenets of intellectual integrity. One can,
after all, treat others fairly, equitably and with dignity, as well as
“maintain integrity and trust” in one’s commitments and interactions without obviating the possibility that
one might also regard or represent the positions of one’s interlocutors as
being of little worth—or even as morally outrageous. Indeed, we
think it is crucial to recognize that “disparaging” others’ positions may well
be part and parcel of the very needful process of critically examining both the
history of philosophy and its contemporary practice with regard to racism,
eurocentrism, sexism, heterosexism, ableism, and other morally objectionable
ideologies. We stipulate that (what we suspect were) the intentions of the
drafting committee in proscribing “disparaging those who hold positions at odds
with one’s own” are well-meaning, but the inclusion of this proscription in a
professional Code of Conduct is both dangerous and frightening. Especially when
coupled with our third concern (detailed below), we maintain that such a
proscription will effectively work as a gag-order against those who might
challenge, dispute, or oppose dominant professional discourses and norms.
Third, the APA Code of
Conduct’s insistence that philosophers have a “special responsibility with
regard to potential liability issues for the institutions for which they work”
is unacceptable. We strenuously
object to
this use in the Code of Conduct (in the section on “Electronic Communications”)
of the term “special responsibility.” As employees, professional philosophers
are all subject to (serious) legal sanction for violations of college/university
rules and regulations, so there is no extra coercive force added by the APA
Code of Conduct’s reiteration of such.
What is added by the Code of
Conduct’s reiteration, which we find both troublesome and entirely inconsistent
with the history of philosophy as it has been practiced for millennia, is the
requirement that philosophers as such
identify themselves on the side of institutions and not, at the risk of
sounding romantic, on the side of Truth. It is not difficult to imagine, or to
find real-world instances of, official or unofficial “relevant institutional
policies” regarding electronic communications that are entirely at odds with
the pursuit of, defense of, or expression of Truth—one might, for instance,
consider the case of the social media policy at The University of Kansas,
discussed here. The opening paragraph of the Code of Conduct
states that “the APA underscores not only the right of all professional
philosophers to academic freedom, but also the responsibility to safeguard and
sustain it.” The APA’s commitment to the responsibility to safeguard and
sustain academic freedom is, in our view, entirely inconsistent with its
requirement that professional philosophers subordinate their intellectual
pursuits to the “potential liability issues for the institutions for which they
work.”
Conduct’s insistence that philosophers have a “special responsibility with
regard to potential liability issues for the institutions for which they work”
is unacceptable. We strenuously
object to
this use in the Code of Conduct (in the section on “Electronic Communications”)
of the term “special responsibility.” As employees, professional philosophers
are all subject to (serious) legal sanction for violations of college/university
rules and regulations, so there is no extra coercive force added by the APA
Code of Conduct’s reiteration of such.
What is added by the Code of
Conduct’s reiteration, which we find both troublesome and entirely inconsistent
with the history of philosophy as it has been practiced for millennia, is the
requirement that philosophers as such
identify themselves on the side of institutions and not, at the risk of
sounding romantic, on the side of Truth. It is not difficult to imagine, or to
find real-world instances of, official or unofficial “relevant institutional
policies” regarding electronic communications that are entirely at odds with
the pursuit of, defense of, or expression of Truth—one might, for instance,
consider the case of the social media policy at The University of Kansas,
discussed here. The opening paragraph of the Code of Conduct
states that “the APA underscores not only the right of all professional
philosophers to academic freedom, but also the responsibility to safeguard and
sustain it.” The APA’s commitment to the responsibility to safeguard and
sustain academic freedom is, in our view, entirely inconsistent with its
requirement that professional philosophers subordinate their intellectual
pursuits to the “potential liability issues for the institutions for which they
work.”
Fourth,
and finally, the APA Code of Conduct’s grossly ambivalent statements regarding
“bullying and harassment” do more harm than good. Since
the initial call for an APA Code of Conduct two years ago, the epidemic of
sexual harassment in Philosophy has (unfortunately) not abated, though it is
(fortunately) the case that it is now exponentially harder to deny. What has changed is that there has been a
statistically significant increase in the number of professional philosophers
participating in various online fora, many of whom opt to participate
pseudonymously or anonymously. As might be expected, the consequence of this
development has been that many of the endemic patterns of IRL bullying and
harassment that plague our profession are being duplicated online. These patterns are now not only absolutely
public, but also as unavoidable as they are inescapable. Consequently, there is
no justifiable reason, in our view,
for the “beating around the bush” section on bullying and harassment in the APA
Code of Conduct. As has been already articulated
quite convincingly by Eric Schliesser (in his post “Onwhy the APA’s Code of Conduct is a Wimpy Attempt at Responding to Brian Leiter”),
there is no reason for the APA not to specifically identify well-known examples
of offenses and offenders. The practical effect of the APA’s ambiguity and equivocation in its
section on “Bullying and Harassment,” we worry, is to put at risk the very
constituency it aims to protect, which we presume (hope!) is that of the most
personally and professionally vulnerable among us. When the Code of Conduct defines
bullying/harassment as “any degrading, hostile,
or offensive conduct or comment by a person towards another that the person knew
or reasonably ought to have known would cause the target to be humiliated,
intimidated, or otherwise gratuitously harmed,” it more or less leaves the hermeneutic barn
door wide open, such that specific instances of conduct or comments that fit
this broad criterion are largely indistinguishable from one another. In
particular, it becomes difficult if not impossible on this basis to distinguish
genuine harassment and abuse of power from critical contestation of the sort we
mention in point two above. This means
that one could reasonably interpret the Code of Conduct to read that what
Michel Foucault called parrhesia
counts as “bullying” in the same way and to the same degree as any
garden-variety racist, sexist, homophobic, ablest diatribe would. And that, in
fact, is precisely how civility standards are often used to silence the
objections of the oppressed to oppressive treatment—a trap into which the APA’s
code falls head first.
and finally, the APA Code of Conduct’s grossly ambivalent statements regarding
“bullying and harassment” do more harm than good. Since
the initial call for an APA Code of Conduct two years ago, the epidemic of
sexual harassment in Philosophy has (unfortunately) not abated, though it is
(fortunately) the case that it is now exponentially harder to deny. What has changed is that there has been a
statistically significant increase in the number of professional philosophers
participating in various online fora, many of whom opt to participate
pseudonymously or anonymously. As might be expected, the consequence of this
development has been that many of the endemic patterns of IRL bullying and
harassment that plague our profession are being duplicated online. These patterns are now not only absolutely
public, but also as unavoidable as they are inescapable. Consequently, there is
no justifiable reason, in our view,
for the “beating around the bush” section on bullying and harassment in the APA
Code of Conduct. As has been already articulated
quite convincingly by Eric Schliesser (in his post “Onwhy the APA’s Code of Conduct is a Wimpy Attempt at Responding to Brian Leiter”),
there is no reason for the APA not to specifically identify well-known examples
of offenses and offenders. The practical effect of the APA’s ambiguity and equivocation in its
section on “Bullying and Harassment,” we worry, is to put at risk the very
constituency it aims to protect, which we presume (hope!) is that of the most
personally and professionally vulnerable among us. When the Code of Conduct defines
bullying/harassment as “any degrading, hostile,
or offensive conduct or comment by a person towards another that the person knew
or reasonably ought to have known would cause the target to be humiliated,
intimidated, or otherwise gratuitously harmed,” it more or less leaves the hermeneutic barn
door wide open, such that specific instances of conduct or comments that fit
this broad criterion are largely indistinguishable from one another. In
particular, it becomes difficult if not impossible on this basis to distinguish
genuine harassment and abuse of power from critical contestation of the sort we
mention in point two above. This means
that one could reasonably interpret the Code of Conduct to read that what
Michel Foucault called parrhesia
counts as “bullying” in the same way and to the same degree as any
garden-variety racist, sexist, homophobic, ablest diatribe would. And that, in
fact, is precisely how civility standards are often used to silence the
objections of the oppressed to oppressive treatment—a trap into which the APA’s
code falls head first.
In summary, we regret
to say that the actual Code of Conduct produced by the APA has, in fact,
confirmed all of the worries (and more) that we expressed in our original essay
“Please Do NOT Revise Your Tone.” Indeed, we are dismayed because, in our view,
the production and publication of this
code is likely to exacerbate many of the problems in the profession, and many
of the problems that APA members face in their academic positions, while doing little
or nothing at all to mitigate the problems it was originally supposed to
address. And while we are certain that the drafters of the Code did not intend
many of the uses to which we find it susceptible to being put, documents of
this sort need to be evaluated in terms of their possible (and likely) effects,
not in terms of the intentions of those who produced them or the body that
adopts them. On this score, the APA’s Code of Conduct is dangerously flawed.
to say that the actual Code of Conduct produced by the APA has, in fact,
confirmed all of the worries (and more) that we expressed in our original essay
“Please Do NOT Revise Your Tone.” Indeed, we are dismayed because, in our view,
the production and publication of this
code is likely to exacerbate many of the problems in the profession, and many
of the problems that APA members face in their academic positions, while doing little
or nothing at all to mitigate the problems it was originally supposed to
address. And while we are certain that the drafters of the Code did not intend
many of the uses to which we find it susceptible to being put, documents of
this sort need to be evaluated in terms of their possible (and likely) effects,
not in terms of the intentions of those who produced them or the body that
adopts them. On this score, the APA’s Code of Conduct is dangerously flawed.